Bread and Donkey for Breakfast how IT law false friends can confound lawmakers: an Italian tale about digital signatures by Bechini, Ugo
False friends are a well known hazard. The same
word can sometimes even be pronounced the
same way in two different languages, but the
meaning can be utterly different. For instance,
Italian and Spanish are very similar languages,
and the word ‘burro’ is pronounced the same way
in both, but actually means ‘butter’ in Italian and
‘donkey’ in Spanish. An Italian tourist who is
having breakfast in a Spanish hotel, the popular
story goes, should not be surprised to be
presented with some bread and a donkey, if he
asks for bread and butter in his mother language.
False friends can also be a danger in the IT law world.
The same words often have different meaning in IT law
and in the general practice.
Consider the meaning of ‘copy’, for instance. A copy in
the physical world is an object that can, generally, be
recognised as such, something in itself different from
the original. This is not at all true in the digital world. A
file, whatever its content, is just a string of zeros and
ones, or of letters and numbers, if you want. If you ask
Alice for Bob’s mobile telephone number, you will not
expect Alice to answer that she cannot give it to you,
because Bob kept his number for himself, and all she
has is a accurate copy of that number. A copy of a
number is the same number again. The same is true for
digital files: they are numbers. The verb ‘to copy’ can be
employed in order to describe the process that allows a
computer user to replicate a file from the hard disk to
her USB device, but the output of such a process is not
a copy in any sense of the word: it is, in fact, a perfect
duplicate. There is no way to tell for certain which is the
‘original’.
This has significant legal implications. In some
countries, such as Italy, there is no formal provision that
prevents a person from executing digital cheques. The
cheque is basically a text: any technician will tell you
that it can be digitally signed very much like anything
else. The lawyer will not find anything against it in the
law, either. But still the answer is no: a cheque cannot
be digitally signed. A digitally signed document is just a
file, as any other file, and can be duplicated endless
times. One cheque could be duplicated one hundred
times and cashed in one hundred different banks, and
nobody would be able to identify the original one. A
digital signature is, therefore, an unsuitable tool
whenever the legal properties of a document stem from
its uniqueness.1
This is a field where neither the law nor IT can walk
alone. A digital signature affixed to a cheque is
technically feasible, and the law (at least in some
countries) does not forbid it. What happens here is that
a legal feature of the cheque is incompatible with a
technical feature of a digital signature. The question is
whether the proposition in italics belongs to IT or the
law. The point is, the lawyer must understand the
technology, because the of the interaction of technology
and law, as Albert de Lapradelle, a professor of
International Law, is understood to have written on the
changes in the law of naval warfare for the Conference
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1 The problem can be solved creating infrastructures
that hold an authoritative copy of the document.
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on The Hague in 1907:
Ce ne sont pas les philosophes avec leurs théories, ni
les juristes avec leurs formules, mais les ingénieurs
avec leurs inventions qui font le droit et le progrès du
droit.
It is not the philosophers and their theories, and
lawyers with their formulas, but the engineers with
their inventions which are the right and the progress
of law.
The ‘signature’ is another dangerous false friend. Unless
biometric technologies are in place (and the quality of
the biometric technology may be the subject of a
challenge), anybody who gains control of the token and
the PIN can create signatures that are, in themselves,
genuine digital signatures. A mansucript signature links
a document to a person, while a digital signature does
not: it links a document to a device. The missing link is
provided by the law; it is the law (in some countries,
and if some conditions are fulfilled) that determine
whether the document is binding to a particular person.
It is a virtual legal technique that holds somebody
responsible for a statement even if it does not come, in
any meaningful sense, from the same person. There is
nothing inherently wrong in this. In most jurisdictions,
for instance, companies are liable for the actions of their
executives, even if they act against the resolutions of
the board. This is a reasonable burden for business
organisations, in the interest of providing for the speed
of a transaction.
The burden would be deemed quite acceptable in the
case of digital signatures, if adequate use policies were
in place and duly followed in everyday life. This means
that each user would have to retain both the signature
token, and secure the PIN without recording it. In this
perspective, such a practice could somehow fill the
existing gap between IT (that cannot guarantee that the
signature comes from a given person) and the law (that
assumes so). This is not about theoretical legal
concepts, but about their acceptability in the context of
a well-functioning and consistent legal environment.
The Italian case is rather special. Millions of smart
cards have been issued, and basically every owner of a
business (including small rural shops) has one. They are
used for tedious bureaucratic chores that can only be
performed with digital signatures. It is not surprising
that the owners of the signature tokens are not thrilled
by the burden. Most of the smart cards, that are usually
blue in colour, are retained in piles in accountants’
offices, each of them with a small yellow Post-It note
with the PIN written on it (perhaps look-conscious
Italians would go for more subtle and fashionable
nuances, if they considered the smart cards really
important). If on-line rumours2 are to be taken at face
value, most of the people do not even know that a smart
card exists in their name.
Nevertheless, lawmakers go on assuming that
documents signed with such smart cards are
tantamount to documents signed with a manuscript
signature. This is what the law provides, and a new
significant implementation was introduced in 2008 that
pushed things even further with Decreto-legge 25
giugno 2008, n. 112 Disposizioni urgenti per lo sviluppo
economico, la semplificazione, la competitività, la
stabilizzazione della finanza pubblica e la perequazione
Tributaria (Decree June 25 2008, n. 112),3 approved with
Legge 6 agosto 2008, n. 133, Conversione in legge, con
modificazioni, del decreto-legge 25 giugno 2008, n. 112,
recante disposizioni urgenti per lo sviluppo economico,
la semplificazione, la competitività, la stabilizzazione
della finanza pubblica e la perequazione tributaria4 (Law
August 6 2008, n. 133, article 36, paragraph 1bis). The
text of the law is full of technicalities that require a deep
knowledge of some obscure details of the Italian legal
system. The relevant part of article 36, paragraph 1bis
reads as follows:
1-bis. L’atto di trasferimento di cui al secondo comma
dell’articolo 2470 del codice civile può essere
sottoscritto con firma digitale, nel rispetto della
normativa anche regolamentare concernente la
sottoscrizione dei documenti informatici, ed e’
depositato, entro trenta giorni, presso l’ufficio del
registro delle imprese nella cui circoscrizione e’
stabilita la sede sociale, a cura di un intermediario
abilitato ai sensi dell’articolo 31, comma 2-quater,
della legge 24 novembre 2000, n. 340.
1-bis. The transfer deed mentioned by Article 2470 of
the Civil Code can be signed with a digital signature,
in accordance with the rules about the signature of
electronic documents, and filed within thirty days, at
the office Registration Court in whose area is
established the head office of the company, through
an authorized agent according to the provision of





3 Pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 147 del 25
giugno 2008 - Suppl. Ordinario n.152/L.
4 Pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 195 del 21
agosto 2008 - Suppl. Ordinario n. 196.
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The possibilities are almost endless: the employee
you just dismissed signs; the employee that your
accountant just dismissed signs too, and dead
people might also sign.
5 Legge 12 agosto 1993, n. 310: Norme per la
trasparenza nella cessione di partecipazioni e nella
composizione della base sociale delle società di
capitali, nonchè nella cessione di esercizi
commerciali e nei trasferimenti di proprietà dei
suoli. (Pubblicata nella G.U. n. 195 del 20 agosto
1993) (Law 12 August 1993 number 310).
6 Civil Law Notaries (CLN) are to be found in
countries that adopt the Latin Notarial system:
about 90 counties that sum up about 55 per cent of
the world’s population. The Civil Law Notary is a
lawyer that has already (albeit not always) been
admitted to the bar; he or she is, at the same time,
an officer of the state and a professional. The
foremost task of the CNL is not the mere
identification of the parties. He is also responsible,
and liable, for an array of different issues related to
the contract. For instance, in real estate
transactions, if the seller was not the legitimate
owner of the estate, the CLN will be required to
refund the buyer. The same will occur if he fails to
properly take care of the mortgages. The CLN must
ensure that the results of the agreement are in
accordance with the provisions of every applicable
law, and explain to the parties the value, legal
effects and consequences of the agreement. In
most countries, he is also required to collect taxes,
and the CLN is personally responsible for paying
the taxes if the job is not properly done. In some
jurisdictions, a CLN is even liable upon failing to
inform the parties about an available tax
deduction. If a house does not match the building
and zoning regulations, liability can sometimes
arise. If a sum of money comes from a source that
cannot be clearly identified, state agencies in
charge of money laundering investigations are
informed. These tasks are performed not only in
the interest of the parties, but in the general public
interest, as it keeps litigation at comparatively
incredibly low levels in all the areas covered by the
work of the CLN.
7 The Italian Companies’ House; it records a wide
array of events during the life of a company,
including share transfers, that are not legally
effective until registered.
8 The full text appeared in Le Società (Milan),
6/2009, p. 738, with an assenting comment by
Vincenzo Salafia, former President of the Corte
d’Appello of Milan, the most authoritative Italian
court in company law. Every Italian Court
(Tribunale) has a judge called the Giudice del
Registro, who is in charge of the Registro delle
Imprese. If any dispute arises about a registration,
the Giudice del Registro decides; the decision can
be overturned by a full Tribunale.
2000, n. 340.
Briefly put: since 1993,5 every sale of a share in an
Italian limited liability company (srl, società a
responsabilità limitata) must be notarized. This
requirement can appear to be far too formal, but it was
part of an attempt to prevent the mafia and other
criminal organisations buying into legitimate
businesses. It is difficult to deny that such a strategic
goal justifies much more than a few annoying
bureaucratic steps. Moreover, the problem, as will be
demonstrated later in this article, lies not the security
level in itself, but in the equivalence (or, better, lack
thereof) between two different procedures, both of
them requiring the use of digital signatures.
In the traditional procedure, still in use, people must
sign a deed before a Civil Law Notary,6 usually drafted
by the CLN himself; it is the notary’s duty to prepare a
digitally signed copy of the deed and send it to the
Registro delle Imprese.7 The data are introduced
automatically into the register, as they are already
presented in XML format and do not require any kind of
manual editing. In the new procedure, the deed is
digitally signed by the parties themselves, and sent to
an accountant, who forwards it to the Registro delle
Imprese. The data processing is the same, but there is a
significant difference: in the new procedure, nobody can
be certain who really signs the deeds. The possibilities
are almost endless: the employee you just dismissed
signs; the employee that your accountant just
dismissed signs too, and dead people might also sign.
In a country where Civil Law Notaries operate, there is
an additional set of differences between a notarized
document and a document that has not been notarized.
The Civil Law Notary is a publicly appointed official who
usually drafts the document, and is responsible to
ascertain that the parties fully understood the
document. Without a CLN, people may sign files they
never read. People might sign files they did not
understand. People may sign poorly drafted files. There
is a lack of proper and impartial legal information. This
is exactly what Mr Giuseppe Limitone in the Vicenza
Court considered in Ordinanza del Giudice del Registro,
April 21st 2009, n. 6/09,8 in which he refused the
registration of a transfer that had been executed in
accordance with the new procedure. The details of the
case are not available in the decision. However, it is
certain that an application was made to delete the
registration of the share transfer because it was not
notarized. It appears the action was initiated by the
seller. This seems to be the case, because the judge is
on record as responding to an argument presented by
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the resistant (only the company is allowed to make an
application to have a registration deleted) by stating
that anybody who as an interest in the matter can take
action, and this would be enough. Nevertheless, he
goes on to make it absolutely clear that the ‘preteso
cedente’ (the purported seller) can take action.
The court began by pointing out that, if the legislature
intended to make share transfers that are only digitally
signed by the parties fit for registration, they fell short
of their target. It was the view of the court that the new
law, seen in the context of the Italian legal system, was
a failure. The traditional procedure provides a check of
the lawfulness of the contract and verification of the
actual (not virtual) identity of the real signer, and this is
vital in order to preserve the reliability of the register.
The new procedure does not prescribe any of the safety
features that have been in place for some time, but at
the same time it does not explicitly state that they are
not required: therefore the court held that the general
rules apply, which means that no data can be entered in
the register without the controlling mechanisms. In
other words, as the old and the new procedure live side
by side, it cannot be imagined that the law may want to
leave people free to choose to be scrutinized or not.
The Vicenza court resolved the matter in a
straightforward manner. The new law does not mention
notarization, but this is a general requirement for any
document presented for registration. This means that
the new procedure requires the document to be
notarized. The court determined that the only possible
applicaiton of the law would be the following:
1. the parties digitally sign the deed;
2. the digital signatures are executed before a notary;
3. the notary certifies the digital signature;
4. the document is sent to the accountant’s office;
5. the notary relays it to the Registro delle Imprese.
The first, fourth and fifth steps are provided by the new
law and are retained; however, the court added steps
two and three as requirements to enable a share
transfer to be registered – the digital signature must be
executed before a Civil Law Notary and officially
certified.9
It is not known at the time of writing if this
interpretation will be widely accepted by Italian courts,
or whether Parliament will modify the legislation in the
light of the decision by the Vicenza Court. The
framework in which this case arose may be unique to
the Italian legal system, but the underlying message is
not. A digital signature cannot always be considered as
equal to a manuscript signature, especially a notarized
one. Whether the passing of Decreto-legge 25 giugno
2008, n. 112 indicated a deliberate change in the legal
philosophy of the Italian state, or whether this was a
mistake, it was big enough to make a judge sitting in
the Vicenza Court of a small (albeit historical) Italian city
stand up, and present the overwhelming majority of his
country’s Parliament with a breath of reality: that if a
digital signature is to have any legal effect, it is
necessary to demonstrate as false the proposition
asserted by technicians that the private key of a digital
signature, when used, proves it has been used the
person whose key it is. This presumption can only carry
any weight in law if a notary attests to the fact that the
private key was used by the person whose key it was. If
Parliament decides to change the law and overturn this
decision, it will, in effect, be overturning the laws that
were enacted to prevent criminal organizations from
buying into legitimate business.
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9 Digital signatures have been notarized in Italy
since 1997: Decreto del Presidente della
Repubblica 10 novembre 1997, n. 513 Regolamento
contenente i criteri e le modalità per la formazione,
l’archiviazione e la trasmissione di documenti con
strumenti informatici e telematici a norma
dell’articolo 15, comma 2, della legge 15 marzo
1997, n. 59 (G. U. 13 marzo 1998, serie generale, n.
60) (Presidential Decree 10 November 1997
number 513, article 16).
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